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Abstract—Key extraction via measuring a physical quantity is
a class of information theoretic key exchange protocols that rely
on the physical characteristics of the communication channel,
to enable the computation of a shared key by two parties that
share no prior secret information. The key is supposed to be
information theoretically hidden to an eavesdropper. Despite the
recent surge of research activity in the area, concrete claims about
the security of the protocols typically rely on channel abstractions
that are not fully experimentally substantiated. In this work,
we propose a novel methodology for the experimental security
analysis of these protocols. The crux of our methodology is a
falsifiable channel abstraction that is accompanied by an efficient
experimental approximation algorithm of the conditional min-
entropy available to the parties given the view of the eavesdropper.
We focus on the signal strength between two wirelessly
communicating transceivers as the measured quantity and we use
an experimental setup to compute the conditional min-entropy
of the channel given the view of the attacker which we find
to be linearly increasing. Armed with this understanding of the
channel, we showcase the methodology by providing a general
protocol for key extraction in this setting that is shown to be
secure for a concrete parameter selection. In this way we provide
a comprehensively analyzed wireless key extraction protocol that
is demonstrably secure against passive adversaries assuming our
falsifiable channel abstraction. Our use of hidden Markov models
as the channel model and a dynamic programming approach to
approximate conditional min-entropy might be of independent
interest, while other possible instantiations of our methodology
can be feasible and may be motivated by this work.
I. INTRODUCTION
Key extraction between two parties, Alice and Bob, by
measuring a physical quantity is based on two basic premises.
First, due to the physical properties of the quantity mea-
sured, Alice and Bob obtain highly correlated measurements.
Second, the measurements obtained by the eavesdropper are
weakly correlated. This hypothesized gap of the correlation
of measurements between Alice and Bob and the correlation
of the eavesdropper’s measurements opens the door for a
key exchange mechanism that would have to perform an
information reconciliation [1] and privacy amplification [2]
step to enable the calculation of a secret key that is almost
independent of the adversary’s view.
In the literature, one can distinguish two classes of such
protocols. The first class is practice-oriented protocols in
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which the security of the key follows directly from certain
strong assumptions or is based (at best) on statistical tests.
The second class is theoretical protocols in which broad
channel abstractions are made and then these are formally
shown to imply a correlation gap between the adversary and
the two parties, thus showing information theoretic security.
Nevertheless, despite that security is proven formally, for a
real-world implementation, a leap of faith is still required to
accept the fact that the channel abstraction is indeed capturing
the real-world setting of the adversary. The only exception is
quantum key-exchange, where there are results from quantum
mechanics such as the no-cloning theorem that do provide
the underlying formal basis justifying the connection between
the channel abstraction and the real-world. The lack of strong
general arguments in key extraction from measuring physical
quantities means that any deviation of the real-world adversary
setting from the assumed channel abstraction will lead to a
security breakdown and thus to a dubious security status for
the key extraction protocol.
In this work we take a first step towards addressing this
fundamental problem by providing a novel formal security
methodology that enables us to argue experimentally about
the security of such protocols. In a nutshell, we put forth
a general framework that (i) enable us to mathematically
estimate the conditional entropy in the key extracted from
physical measurements; (ii) the security arguments can be
tied to a specific real-world setting through falsifiable (but
not oversimplified) assumptions.
A. Related Work and Our Results
Information-theoretic treatment of secure key exchange was
initiated by Wyner [3] in the wiretap model and it was later
studied by Maurer [4] and Ahlswede, Csiszar [5] in the com-
mon random source model. These works dealt with the fea-
sibility of key exchange assuming a non-zero “equivocation-
rate”, a measure expressing the uncertainty of the eavesdropper
about the parties’ communication. Beyond generic schemes,
for specific physical quantities, there has already been a series
of theoretical studies, in quantum key exchange [6], and
wireless key exchange focusing on the “secrecy capacity”
between wirelessly communicating transceivers, (e.g., [7],
following the wiretap channel and [8]–[14], following the
shared randomness channel.) These works, being conceptual
only [13], [14], or information theoretic in nature, contain no
experimental justification of the channel model they utilize:
for the quantum ones, the underlying physics justify the model
but the wireless ones have no real-world justification, most of
them relying on the assumption that the signal measurements
are independent across time and thus any existing non-zero
equivocation rate can be magnified for a suitable number of
transmissions straightforwardly.
Considering works that were more experimental in nature,
there were several practical algorithms suggested for wireless
key extraction [15]–[25]. A common characteristic of these
works is that significant attention is given to demonstrate
correctness (i.e., that Alice and Bob calculate the same key),
and efficiency; much less formal analysis (as we detail below)
is performed to demonstrate security. More specifically, the
security of many of these works, e.g., [16], [18], [19], [23],
directly relied on the assumption that if the adversary is a
wavelength away from the communicating parties, the adver-
sary’s observation is independent of the parties’ measurements.
Some other works made some further steps to analyze security.
For instance, [23], [24] consider performing randomness tests
but these are insufficient as security guarantees (such “ran-
dom” sequences are not necessarily unpredictable). In [20] a
type of attacks based on blind deconvolution is considered
and it is argued experimentally that such attacks are unlikely
to apply; however, this does not preclude other types of
attacks. Works such as [17], [22] provided informal security
arguments based on calculating the correlation between the
eavesdropper’s measurements and the parties’ measurements.
However, such correlation calculation can not guarantee the
amount of (conditional) entropy contained in the extracted key.
In fact, the lack of properly rigorous security claims can
lead to (partial) key recovery attacks as demonstrated in [26],
[27] that examined known protocols in a specific deployment.
These works exemplified the fact that even though existing
analysis has demonstrated successfully that the signal observed
by the two parties has sufficient entropy it remains open
whether the conditional entropy on the eavesdropper’s view
is non-zero in a specific real-world deployment.
A number of techniques for reconciling the errors between
the two communicating parties have been shown in the liter-
ature. For real valued measurements (as in the wireless key
exchange setting), a popular approach employs a “threshold-
ing” methodology [17], [23] where the signal is transformed
to a bitstring using only the level of measurements where, for
example, deep fades are observed. In such settings it can be
shown that the errors are so few that reconciliation becomes
easy. Unfortunately, such reconciliation requires interaction
that may result in potentially zeroing the conditional entropy, a
fact that experimentally remains open. Other approaches suffer
from similar problems, such as [16] that relies on the Cascade
protocol or [22] that uses specialized antennas.
We conclude that information theoretic security in all these
previous works relies on whether the channel abstraction fits
the real-world adversary setting and whether any additional
reconciliation interaction performed does not cut from the
conditional entropy too much. While ad hoc lower bound
assumptions on the conditional entropy of Alice and Bob’s
measurements given the view of the adversary are sufficient to
argue the security of the key, it is very hard to experimentally
verify that such assumptions are indeed true. Indeed, in order
to apply the textbook calculation of conditional entropy, one
would have to carry experiments an immense number of times.
Even worse, one can formally prove that an exponential num-
ber of samples are necessary for approximating conditional
entropy in the general case (this can be derived from [28]).
In this work we address the above problems with the
following contributions.
• First, we introduce a methodology to experimentally
argue about the security of key exchange protocols that
are based on measuring real-valued physical quantities
in the passive model: The crux of our methodology is
a falsifiable channel abstraction that is accompanied by
an efficient experimental approximation algorithm of the
conditional min-entropy of the two parties given the view
of the eavesdropper.
Specifically, we model measurements and adversarial
observations via a hidden Markov model (HMM) and
we utilize a dynamic programming approach to estimate
the conditional min-entropy 1 : we achieve that through a
combination of the Viterbi algorithm [31] and the forward
algorithm [32]. This algorithmic approach is beneficial as
it allows with only a polynomial number of experiments
in the size of the key to argue about the conditional min-
entropy without oversimplifying the channel abstraction
(e.g., assuming measurements are mutually independent
across time [7]–[12]).2 Furthermore, the Markovian na-
ture of the channel is falsifiable and is possible to verify it
experimentally. Given the conditional min-entropy bound,
we eventually show security through the calculation of
the min-entropy loss during the standard protocol steps
of quantization, privacy amplification and information
reconciliation. We showcase the result by providing a
general protocol following these three steps that relies on
“low-distortion” embeddings [33], secure sketches, [34]
and randomness extractors [35]. We note that the HMM
abstraction is only one out of many ways to instantiate our
methodology for arguing about security and there could
be others that may be discovered motivated by our work.
• Second, we apply the methodology we put forth above
to the setting of wireless key exchange, where the signal
strength is the target physical quantity that the two parties
measure. We designed an experimental configuration that
enabled us to measure the conditional min entropy as well
as the correctness of channel abstraction our methodol-
ogy utilizes. Our experimental configuration included a
robotic mobile device equipped with various transceivers
that performed measurements of signal strength over long
periods of time. Using the data and our methodology
1There are works studying the capacity of Markovian channels [29], or
using HMM to model the package loss process to infer channel parameters
[30]. To the best of our knowledge, our work, for the first time, uses HMM
to model channels subject to adversarial eavesdropping, for the purpose of
deriving conditional entropy lower bounds for security guarantees.
2Note that we are note claiming HMM exactly models how channel
behaves, instead, allowing correlation across signals is an important first step
towards the real world model departing from those idealized assumptions.
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we calculated the conditional min-entropy and error rate
over time, showing the feasibility of secure key exchange
for the type of adversaries used in our experimental
setup. Our experimental results enabled us to identify the
concrete parameters needed for generating a secure key
of a specific length and also predict how these parameters
would need to change for generating longer keys.
We note that our work focuses on demonstrating feasibility
of analyzing security for physical layer key extraction from
experimentally falsifiable assumptions; while our instantiation
is practical, we leave for future work the further optimization
of efficiency within our framework. Finally we stress that a
more ambitious objective would be to provide a framework
for security in the active adversarial model; indeed, in key
extraction protocols certain types of active attacks have been
demonstrated, e.g., [12], [36], [37]. While this is beyond the
scope of the present work, a framework such as ours that pro-
vides a way to lower bound the conditional entropy available
to the two transceivers can be a fundamental intermediate step
towards a formal treatment of security in the active model.
II. BACKGROUND OF KEY EXTRACTION FROM
MEASURING PHYSICAL QUANTITIES
A. Definitions
The problem of key extraction from physical measurements
can be abstracted as a game between two players, Alice and
Bob, who have access to their own separate measurement
devices for a certain physical quantity. The physical quantity
itself is generated through the actions of Alice, Bob and
potentially also the adversary, Eve and for the purpose of this
section will remain purposefully undetermined (we will detail
a specific instantiation in section IV).
We will use X1, . . . , Xn to denote the measurements ob-
tained by Alice, and X ′1, . . . , X ′n the measurements obtained
by Bob. Finally the adversary is also able to obtain measure-
ments of the same physical quantity denoted by Y1, . . . , Yn.
The value n is arbitrary and the algorithm for extracting the
key should allow any choice for this value. The mechanism for
determining the appropriate value of n, given a certain level
of security that needs to be attained is, in fact, an important
part of the protocol design problem. Beyond access to the
measurements, we assume also that the parties, Alice and Bob
have the ability to engage in “public discussion.”, i.e., they can
utilize an authenticated channel. The implementation of this
channel is separate and orthogonal to our objectives.
Given the above, a (l, ǫc, ǫu) key generation system is a
protocol between Alice and Bob running over an authenti-
cated channel so that each party has access to their physical
measurement devices and satisfies these properties:
• (Correctness) Alice and Bob both output the same l-bit
key with probability 1− ǫc.
• (Security) Conditional to the view of any adversary the
key calculated by the two parties has statistical distance
from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}l at most ǫu.
The most important consideration in the process of describ-
ing how to extract the key from the physical measurements
performed by Alice and Bob is determining the amount of
uncertainty that exists in the measurements conditioned on
the view of the adversary – if no sufficient uncertainty exists
then they cannot be expected to complete the key extraction
securely. We first recall the standard definitions of metrics for
uncertainty: min-entropy and conditional min-entropy.
Definition 1: The min-entropy H∞(A) of a random vari-
able A is defined as H∞(A) = − log(maxa Pr[A = a]).
The conditional min-entropy of A on the event that another
random variable B equals a specific value b is H∞(A|B =
b) = − log(maxa Pr[A = a|B = b]). Further, we define
the (average-case) conditional min-entropy of A given B as
H˜∞(A|B) = − log(Eb←B [2−H∞(A|B=b)]) 3.
B. A General Protocol
Next, we will present a general protocol for our key gener-
ation process from measuring physical quantities. It has three
basic steps. First, A and B produce a sequence of events and
their corresponding measurements and then convert them to
bitstrings denoted by ρA and ρB , respectively. Subsequently
they perform information reconciliation and privacy amplifica-
tion. All these techniques are fairly standard, we choose them
properly so that our protocol enable us to bound the entropy
loss that takes place during each step of the execution of the
algorithm and ensures the proper extraction of the key.
Bit Quantization Each party has at its disposal a series
of measurements X1, . . . , Xn. We put forth a quantization
approach that utilizes a low distortion embedding τ from ℓ1-
distance metric space into Hamming distance metric space.
The ℓ1-distance (or Manhattan distance) between two vectors
X,Y in an n dimensional real vector space is defined as
the sum of the absolute difference between corresponding
coordinates, i.e, ℓ1(X,Y) =
∑
n |Xi − Yi|, where X =
(Xi, . . . , Xn),Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn).
An embedding is a mapping between two metric spaces.
It is said to have distortion c if and only if the distance is
preserved with up to a multiplicative factor of c [38]. Given a
low distortion embedding τ , we not only quantize the physical
measurements, but also prepare two bitstrings to have a small
Hamming distance which is critical for the reconciliation
algorithm. Last, it is not hard to construct a low distortion
embedding, one can verify the following proposition that a
simple unary encoding is a good low distortion embedding.
Proposition 1: Suppose B is a finite set of integers, and
m = max{|x| | x ∈ B}, Consider the mapping τ : B →
{0, 1}m defined by applying a unary encoding, i.e, τ(x) is a
bitstring of length m, and it is composed of m−|x| consecutive
0s followed by |x| consecutive 1’s. Then, τ is an embedding
with distortion at most 1.
Reconciliation using Secure Sketches After collecting mea-
surements and performing the bit quantization step, Alice
and Bob possess two N -bit strings ρA, ρB , respectively.
For now, we assume that there exists a d ∈ N such that
with overwhelming probability the Hamming distance satisfies
H(ρA, ρB) ≤ d. The value of d in specific protocol can be
determined experimentally for a given physical quantity, (we
3See [34] for detailed justifications of the definition of average-case
conditional min-entropy.
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do that in the next section, see Figure 4 and Table I). We next
describe our information reconciliation protocol that can be
proven correct under the above definitions.
First, recall that an 〈n,m,m′, d〉-secure sketch [34] is a
pair of randomized procedures, “sketch” (SS), and “recover”
(REC), such that SS on input n-bit string w, returns a bit string
s ∈ {0, 1}∗, and REC takes an n-bit string w′ and a bit string
s ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs an n-bit string.
SS and REC satisfy correctness and security. In par-
ticular, correctness states that if H(w,w′) ≤ d, then
REC(w′,SS(w)) = w; while security means that for any
distribution W with min-entropy m over {0, 1}n, the value
of W can be recovered by an adversary who observes s with
probability no greater than 2−m′ , i.e, H˜∞(W |SS(W )) ≥ m′.
Achieving information reconciliation between two parties
holding data w,w′ respectively using sketches is simple. The
first party transmits s = SS(w) and the second computes
REC(w′, s). Various secure sketches can be designed depend-
ing on the metric space. We next recall two secure sketches
over the Hamming metric. Let C be an error correcting code
over Fn2 which corrects up to d errors and |C| = 2k. Thus, there
is an algorithm Dec that given any v ∈ C and any e ∈ {0, 1}n
with Wt(e) ≤ d, it holds that Dec(v ⊕ e) = v, where Wt(·)
stands for the Hamming weight of e. Observe that under our
assumption H(ρA, ρB) is at most d and thus the output of
Bob is exactly ρA. It follows that Alice and Bob recover ρA
and thus information reconciliation is achieved.
We note that the communication overhead of the above pro-
tocol is unnecessarily high. An improvement can be achieved
by using a more communication efficient secure sketch. For
a (n, k) linear code, the n × (n − k) parity check matrix H
has the property that for every codeword c, c ·H = 0. For any
transmitted message y = x + e of length n, the syndrome is
defined as syn(y) = y ·H. Assuming that the error-codeword
e can be easily computed using syn(e) (doing what is known
as syndrome-decoding) the length of the sketch is only n− k.
Bob computes the syndrome for his own bits, syn(ρB), and
finally computes syn(e) = syn(ρB)−syn(ρA), from which
he obtains e, and thus ρA = ρB−e. It is not hard to see that the
syndrome based construction is an (n,m,m−n+k, d)-secure
sketch, from the chain rule described in definition 1.
Privacy Amplification After both parties have derived the
same bitstrings, they must “purify” the strings to make the joint
output suitably random as a cryptographic key. For this task,
we employ a randomness extractor [35]. We first recall the def-
inition of statistical distance which characterizes how similar
two distributions are. Then the level of randomness of a ran-
dom variable can be measured by the statistical distance of the
variable from the uniform distribution. The statistical distance
of two probability distributions X1, X2 with support S is:
max
T⊆S
{Pr[X1 ∈ T ]− Pr[X2 ∈ T ]}, denoted by SD(X1, X2).
It can be also defined as 12
∑
s∈S |PrX1 [s] − PrX2 [s]|. Two
distributions X1, X2 are said to be ǫ-close if SD(X1, X2) ≤ ǫ.
We now define randomness extractors.
Definition 2: A function Ext : {0, 1}t × {0, 1}r →
{0, 1}l is a (t, s, l, ǫ)-extractor if for every random vari-
able X over {0, 1}t having min-entropy at least s, it
holds that Ext(X,Ur) is ǫ-close to Ul, where Ur, Ul de-
note uniform distributions over {0, 1}r and {0, 1}l respec-
tively. Further, we say Ext is an (t, s, l, ǫ)-strong extractor
if:SD((Ext(X,Ur), Ur), (Ul, Ur)) ≤ ǫ. Finally, Ext is an
average-case (t, s, l, ǫ)-strong extractor if the above holds
when H˜∞(X |Y ) ≥ s for some random variable Y that is
known to the adversary.
The following lemma shows that there are efficient con-
structions of (average case) strong extractor and thus we may
utilize a public random seed to obtain a close to uniform key.
Lemma 1 ( [34]): Universal hash functions [39] are av-
erage case (t, s, l, ǫ) strong extractors whenever s ≥ l +
2 log(1
ǫ
)− 2.
III. A CONDITIONAL MIN-ENTROPY LEARNER FOR
MARKOVIAN PROCESSES
Now we proceed to introduce the central problem for se-
curity argument of any key-extraction system from measuring
physical quantities. Fix a pair of jointly distributed random
variables X,Y, the problem of learning conditional min-
entropy is to estimate H˜∞(X |Y ) from polynomially many
measurements of X,Y. Unfortunately, in the general case, the
problem is infeasible to solve. As shown in [28] that at least
O( NlogN ) many samples are needed for estimating the entropy
where N is the support size. It is easy to see that conditional
entropy is even more difficult to learn, since one can reduce
the problem of learning the entropy to learning the conditional
entropy over a uniformly distributed variable. It follows that in
the general case the conditional min-entropy is not learnable
efficiently. It is therefore important to identify classes of
distributions for which the conditional min-entropy can be
learned. Then, when a certain type of physical measurement
can be justified experimentally to follow the distribution,
our security argument will provide strong evidence regarding
the security of key extraction from such measurements. We
identify a wide class of distributions of measurements below.
Recall that Alice’s measurements are denoted by X =
X1, . . . , Xn, while adversary Eve’s observations are Y =
Y1, . . . , Yn. A simple observation is that the conditional min-
entropy can be calculated directly (via textbook formula) in
time polynomial in the support of X and Y. This obviously
does not help since the support sets are growing exponentially
in n. Note that both measurements X,Y are composed of
a sequence of correlated variables with a relatively small
support. A way to simplify the problem is to assume in-
dependence among these variables - however this can be
unrealistic. Here we propose a more realistic assumption that
the variables are correlated, but it would still allow us to
learn the conditional entropy efficiently. Our main idea is to
consider Alice’s measurements X1, . . . , Xn as hidden states of
a Markov process, while taking Eve’s observations Y1, . . . , Yn
as the visible output. The following are the basic elements of
an HMM (see [40] for a survey):
• k, number of hidden states
• S, set of states, S = {s1, . . . , sk}
• m, number of observed symbols
• O, set of observed symbols, O = {o1, . . . , om}
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• X = X1, . . . , Xn, sequence of hidden states
• Y = Y1, . . . , Yn, sequence of observed symbols
• A, the state transition probability matrix, aij =
Pr[Xt+1 = sj |Xt = si]
• B, the observation probability distribution, bj(oq) =
Pr[Yt = oq|Xt = sj ]
• π, the initial state distribution, πi = Pr[X1 = si]
Given the above we now turn to the conditional min-entropy
calculation. From Definition 1, we get:
H˜∞(X|Y) = − log(Ey←Y[2−H∞(X|Y=y)])
= − log(Ey←Y[maxx Pr(X = x|Y = y)])
= − log(
∑
y←Y
[maxx Pr(X = x,Y = y)]) (1)
We first calculate the maximum joint probability
for a given sequence of observed symbols y1, . . . , yn:
maxx1,...,xn Pr[X = x1, . . . , xn,Y = y1, . . . , yn].
This joint probability can be calculated using the Viterbi
algorithm which is a dynamic programming algorithm we
briefly describe below.
Consider the objective function δt(si) = max
x1,...,xt−1
Pr(X1 =
x1, . . . , Xt = si, Y1 = y1, . . . , Yt = yt), our goal is then to
calculate maxs δn(s), with the following recursive relation:
δt+1(sj) = maxsi [δt(si)aij ]bj(yt+1), which is satisfied by
any HMM. The Viterbi algorithm consists of three key steps:
1) Initialization: δi(si) = πi · b1(y1)
2) Recursion: δt+1(sj) = maxsi [δt(si)aij ]bj(yt+1)
3) Termination: P ∗ = maxs δn(s)
It follows that we can calculate the maximum joint probabil-
ity for a given observation sequence. Still, to get an estimation
for the average case min-entropy by applying formula (1), we
need to sum up all such joint probability for all possible obser-
vation sequences. It is very likely that there are exponentially
many such sequences. For example, suppose for any state si,
there are only 3 possible observations, but they are equally
possible. In this case, there would be 3n possible observation
sequences with length n.
To circumvent the above, we also study the property of
the distribution of conditional entropy for fixed observed
sequences (i.e., when conditioned on a specific sequence of
Eve’s measurements).
Note that the Viterbi algorithm gives only the maximum
joint probability, in order to estimate the conditional min-
entropy given each observed sequence, we need to further get
the probability of appearance for each observed sequence. The
forward algorithm [32] can be used to calculate this quantity
in an HMM. For a given observed sequence y1, . . . , yn,
we define the objective function as: αt(si) = Pr[Y1 =
y1, . . . , Yt = yt, Xt = si], then the probability of the sequence
Pr[Y1 = y1, . . . , Yn = yn] =
∑
i αn(si). The forward
algorithm proceeds as:
• Initialization: α1(si) = πi · bi(y1)
• Induction: αt+1(sj) = [
∑
i αt(si) · ai,j ]bj(yt+1)
• Termination: P =
∑
i αn(si)
If we assume that the conditional min-entropies on fre-
quently appearing observations are stably distributed, then, the
average case min-entropy can be approximated by the average
of conditional min-entropies on fixed observations. In other
words, Ey←Y[2−H∞(X|Y=y)] will be almost the same as the
value 2−H∞(X|Y=y) for each y, and thus we can approximate
H˜∞(X|Y) as the average of H∞(X|Y = y) from all the
measurements y we observe.
Now, suppose we perform a series of M experiments, each
one with n measurements. For the j-th experiment, we record
the measurements of Eve, and we use them together with the
HMM parameters to calculate the maximum of conditional
probability as P
∗
j
Pj
, where P ∗j is the maximum joint probability
given an observed sequence, returned by the Viterbi algorithm.
The conditional min-entropy for this observed sequence is
− log(
P∗j
Pj
). In this way, we will use the average of these
entropies to approximate the average case min-entropy.
To summarize, with the following channel abstractions, one
can learn the conditional min-entropy from only a reasonable
number of experiments.
1) First, the measurements are produced from a memory-
less Markov process, that is, ∀i, j, we have: Pr[Xi =
x1|Xi−1 = x0] = Pr[Xj = x1|Xj−1 = x0].
2) Second, the observation probability does not change over
time: specifically, for all different times i, j, Pr[Yi =
y|Xi = x] = Pr[Yj = y|Xj = x].
3) Further, observations are independent, i.e., ∀n, Pr[Y1 =
y1, . . . , Yn = yn|X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn] =∏n
i=1 Pr[Yi = yi|Xi = xi].
4) Finally, stable conditional entropy assumption: we as-
sume that the random variable H∞(X|Y = y) has
small standard deviation (hence its expectation can be
calculated via a small number of experiments).
The advantage of our approach is that in concrete applica-
tion scenarios, the conditions can be experimentally justified.
Then, if the physical measurements do satisfy these properties,
we can apply our method to approximate the conditional min-
entropy thus laying a basis for secure extraction following the
protocol and analysis we present in the next section.
IV. APPLICATION: PHYSICAL LAYER KEY EXTRACTION
WITH EXPERIMENTAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now provide a key extraction protocol from wireless sig-
nals and analyze its security using the methodology proposed
above. Furthermore, we instantiate it with concrete parameters
enabling the two parties to derive e.g., a 128-bit key.
A. Key Extraction Protocol from Wireless Signal Envelope
Two nodes Alice and Bob execute a ping-like protocol,
they send each other messages through a wireless channel
and measure the received wireless signal strength. Then they
apply the general protocol of the previous section to those
measurements to extract a key which will later be used for their
secure communication. Note that since the actually messages
communicated do not affect the exchange, the measurements
can be collected during a regular plaintext communication
between Alice and Bob. This means that key-exchange in this
setting can piggyback on top of a plaintext communication.
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Alice Bob
X1
ping
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
pong
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ X ′1
.
.
.
.
.
.
Xn
ping
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
pong
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ X ′n
s
r
← {0, 1}r
ρA = τ(X1, . . . , Xn) ρB = τ(X
′
1, . . . , X
′
n)
u = syn(ρA)
u,s
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ find e, s.t syn(e) = syn(ρB)− u
Return key = Ext(ρA, s) Return key = Ext(ρB − e, s)
Fig. 1. Our physical-layer key extraction. syn is the algorithm computing the syndrome w.r.t. a public error-correcting code, τ(·) is a low-distortion
embedding into Hamming metric space, s is the short random seed for extractor Ext.
Our concrete key extraction protocol from received wireless
signal strength is presented in Figure 1.
B. Experimental Setup
The hardware basis for our experimental platform was the
Crossbow MICAz sensor mote, which contains a Chipcon
CC2420 IEEE 802.15.4-compliant RF transceiver. The RF
transceiver in our experiments operated at a frequency of 2.48
GHz and with a data rate of 250 kbps. Transmit power was
set to the maximum level of 0 dBm for each MICAz device
in our test network.
The software portion of our experimental platform primarily
consisted of a ping-like application that we implemented
on top of the TinyOS operating system. Our implementation
consists of three components: a base station (Alice), a mobile
client (Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve). Bob sends a PING
frame containing a 4-byte sequence number to Alice, who
records the sequence number and the received frame’s RSSI
value as computed by the CC2420 transceiver. Alice then sends
a PONG frame to Bob containing the sequence number from
Bob’s original PING request. Bob records the response frame’s
RSSI value, waits for 1300ms, increments the sequence num-
ber and repeats the above process. If Bob does not receive
a response within 500ms of transmitting his ping request, he
will increment the current sequence number and transmit a
new ping request. The 1300ms delay between PING frames
sent by Bob is intended to ensure that our assumption of
independence between non-consecutive channel samples apart
holds true, which we experimentally evaluate in Section IV-E.
The eavesdropper implementation, Eve, simply listens pas-
sively for any frames transmitted by any other nearby nodes.
Eve records the source and destination addresses, frame type
(i.e., PING or PONG), sequence number and observed RSSI
value for that frame. After the experiment is manually termi-
nated, the recorded data is uploaded from each sensor mote to
a laptop for further processing and analysis. We resolve lost
frames during post-processing by computing the intersection
between frame sequence numbers observed by Alice and those
observed by Bob. In practice, Alice and Bob could use an
acknowledgement-based protocol (e.g., TCP) to detect lost
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Fig. 2. Floorplan for our indoor test environment and layout of sensor motes.
Node 1 is the stationary base station (Alice) and Node 2 (Bob) is fixed to a
robotic platform that moves randomly throughout the test environment. The
remaining five nodes are passive eavesdropper nodes (Eve) that simply record
all observed frames and their observed RSSI values.
frames; however, we opted for a post-processing approach for
simplicity of implementation.
We conducted two separate data collection experiments in
a basic indoor residential environment. In each experiment,
we placed the stationary base station (Alice) in the middle of
the environment with five eavesdropper nodes placed around
the base station as shown in Figure 2. The mobile node
(Bob) was mounted to a purpose-built robotic platform that
was programmed to move throughout the environment in a
random pattern for the duration of the experiment at a rate of
approximately 14 cm/sec while avoiding obstacles. The robot
would move forward for a period of time selected uniformly
at random from between 5 and 15 seconds. At the end of
the randomly selected travel time, the robot would turn at
an angle selected uniformly at random from between -75 to
75 degrees indicating a left or right turn, respectively. If the
robot detected an obstacle via its front-mounted bump sensors
or ultrasonic sensor before the time expired, the robot would
similarly choose a new direction and travel time at random.
The travel time and turn angles were selected primarily based
on the small size of the test environment.
Each sensor mote can store up to 25,000 channel measure-
ments and so, with a 1300ms delay between PING frames,
each experiment represents approximately nine hours of con-
tinuous movement over a total distance traveled of around 4
6
kilometers per experiment. The data for each node from both
experiments were concatenated together resulting in slightly
less than 50,000 samples for each node after accounting for
lost or dropped frames. Note that the number of samples we
collected is for the purpose of our security analysis; an actual
key can be computed much faster. See Section IV-D for more
details on the number of samples required for key extraction.
C. Security Analysis of Our Key Extraction Protocol
Each experimental dataset was downsampled by six samples
in order to simulate a greater idle time between PING frames
and ensure that a channel sample Xi is correlated only with
Xi−1, Xi+1, the reasoning will be explained in Section IV-E.
After downsampling, we still have around 8100 samples in the
experiment. We took 8000 samples and divided them into 100-
sample slices, each slice representing a single key experiment.
Learning the conditional min-entropy: First, we estimate
the average case min-entropy of Alice’s channel measurements
given a single adversary’s view using the methodology pro-
posed in Section III by incorporating the data from the key
experiments. In our setup, there are 5 adversarial nodes and
we calculated the entropy for each one separately. All our
measurements were calculated for 32 distinct signal levels.
Moreover, to make our adversarial model stronger, we simply
ignored for both Alice and Bob all samples that were not also
observed by Eve. By doing so, we ensure that we could obtain
security without relying on frames missed by the eavesdropper.
For every experiment of 100 samples, we first compute the
maximum conditional probability of the observed sequence by
using the Viterbi algorithm and forward algorithm as explained
in Section III; After getting the conditional min-entropy for
the 80 key experiments, we average them to approximate
the average case min-entropy due to the assumption that the
conditional min-entropies on specific observations are stably
distributed (experimental justification will appear in Figure 7).
Since Xi, the random variable representing Alice’s i-th
sample, follows the same distribution for all i (will be justified
in Section IV-E), we get the initial state distribution π by
counting throughout all channel samples. We prepare the state
transition probability matrix A by estimating entry aij by njni ,
where nj is the number of measurements equal to si such
that the next measurement equals sj , and ni is the number
of measurements equal to si. Similarly, we approximate entry
bj(k) for the observation probability distribution by mkmj where
mj is the number of Alice’s measurements equal to sj ,
and mk is the number of Eve’s observations equal to ok
while the corresponding measurements of Alice is sj . This is
reasonable since the observation probability does not change
(the independent observation assumption).
With all these parameters, we next apply the Viterbi algo-
rithm and forward algorithm to compute the maximum con-
ditional probability maxx1,...,x100 Pr[X1 = x1, . . . , X100 =
x100|y1, . . . , y100], for every experiment, where y1, . . . , y100
are Eve’s measurements for a 100-sample slice. We then apply
minus logarithm to those probabilities, and average them to
get our final approximation for the average case min-entropy
Node M n N d¯ H Re R
3 80 100 800 4.42 88.40 0.55% 11.05%
4 80 100 800 4.29 99.82 0.54% 12.48%
5 80 100 800 4.36 98.89 0.55% 12.36%
6 80 100 800 4.28 93.07 0.54% 11.63%
7 80 100 800 4.35 94.08 0.54% 11.76%
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF CONDITIONAL MIN-ENTROPY FOR THE 5
EAVESDROPPING NODES. M : # OF EXPERIMENTS,n: # OF CHANNEL
SAMPLES IN EACH EXPERIMENT,N = |ρA|: THE LENGTH OF BIT STRING
AFTER BIT QUANTIZATION, d¯: THE AVERAGE # OF WORD ERRORS, H : THE
AVERAGE CASE MIN-ENTROPY,Re = d/|ρA|: AVERAGE ERROR RATE, AND
R: AVERAGE ENTROPY RATE. THE NODE IDS ARE AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 2.
contained in 100 samples of Alice. Comparisons for the five
nodes are shown in the sixth column of Table I.
Accounting for Entropy Loss: With a reasonable amount
of entropy contained in Alice’s channel measurements, condi-
tioned on adversary’s view, we now proceed to calculate the
entropy loss for each step, and subtract those losses to get the
final result about security of the key.
First, for the bit quantization step, the way we defined the
embedding τ , it is a one-to-one map so, obviously, there is no
entropy loss during this step. Thus, H˜∞(ρA|Y) = H˜∞(X|Y).
Next we consider the entropy loss in the information rec-
onciliation step. Suppose an (n, k) binary code is used to
construct the syndrome based secure sketch u described in
the protocol shown in Fig 1, a total of |u| = n − k bits are
transmitted during the information reconciliation step. Thus,
H˜∞(ρA|Y, u) = H˜∞(X|Y, u) ≥ H˜∞(X|Y)− |u|.
Finally, according to lemma 1, if H˜∞(ρA|Y, u) ≥ s ≥
l + 2 log 1
ǫu
, we can apply a (t, s, l, ǫu) strong average case
extractor to extract a key of length l with distribution ǫu close
to the uniform distribution over {0, 1}l.
Summarizing above, we derive a sufficient condition for
extracting a secure key. Note that as long as the error rate
is not too high, and there is a non-zero entropy left after the
phase of information reconciliation, it is always possible to
amplify the entropy by collecting more samples before the bit
quantization step, and leaves room for privacy amplification.
D. Instantiation of Our Protocol
In this section, we will instantiate our general protocol for
physical layer key extraction with concrete parameters from
the experimental data.
We first study how conditional entropy grows in a block of
samples with different size. By taking 10 samples as a unit,
we slice the 8000 samples into 40 pieces, each representing
an individual experiment with 200 samples. We then calculate
conditional min-entropy (of 10 samples, 20 samples, and so
forth until 200 samples) using our methodology by averaging
among these 40 experiments. In this way we get the plot of
the average conditional min-entropy with standard deviation
of the 40 values as shown in Figure 3. We use the method
of least squares to get an approximation of the average case
min-entropy as a linear function of the number of samples and
obtain the following equation: g(x) = 9851000x+
1467
1000 , i.e., there
is g(x) bits average case min-entropy in every x samples.
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Fig. 3. Linear growth of conditional min-entropy for node4, x-axis is
the number of samples in the sequence, y-axis is the value of conditional
min-entropy, the (blue) points are average of conditional min-entropy in 40
experiments, the (red) lines start from mean-standard deviation and extend to
mean+standard deviation.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of errors, x-axis is the number of samples, y-axis is the
number of errors, the (blue) points are average among 40 experiments, the
(red) lines start from mean-standard deviation to mean+standard deviation
Similarly, we study the distribution of word (8-bit block)
errors. We first divide the bitstrings ρA, ρB in 8-bit blocks,
and count the number of different blocks between ρA, ρB .
The result is presented in Figure 4. In this way we obtain an
approximation of the average word error e: e(x) = 431000x +
48
1000 , which means there are e(x) word errors on average in
x-sample experiment.
Our results experimentally show the linear growth of con-
ditional min-entropy and that of errors. We can now provide
an explicit instantiation of our protocol.
Theorem 1: Suppose n is number of samples in our pro-
tocol. Using a Reed-Solomon code over F28 for the sketch,
when n ≥ max{12.54λ + 6.27l − 3.24, 2326c− 1}, we can
successfully implement a (l, e−c, 2−λ) key generation system.
Proof: Given the estimated conditional entropy rate as
g(n) = 9851000n+
1467
1000 , and error rate as e(n) =
43
1000n+
48
1000 ,
we choose a RS code over F28 which can correct up to 65e(n)
errors (slice the bitstring into proper sized blocks if needed).
Thus, the entropy loss of applying the code would be 8 ·2 · 65e,
the entropy loss of applying extractor is 2λ, and similar to the
analysis at the end of section IV-C, we immediately get: if
159.4n+ 549.4 > 1000l + 2000λ, we will have a l-bits key
with 2−λ distance to Ul. For correctness, from the Chernoff
bound, the probability of having 65e(n) errors is e
−e(n)
100 , we
can easily derive another condition.
To put the above into perspective, if we set ǫc = e−1, ǫu =
2−80, we can do the following: first we make around 1800
measurements, then use a 8-bit unary encoding on the absolute
value. (We take only 5-bit precision for the RSSI value.)
Finally, we employ a (255,229)-RS code for secure sketch and
apply 2-universal hash functions [39] as randomness extractor
X i  = k
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Fig. 5. Correlation between Pr[Xi−1|Xi = k] and Pr[Xi+1|Xi = k] for
channel sample values k ∈ [9, 29].
and harvest a 128-bit key. Note that the success rate of the
exchange is at least 1 − 1
e
and is detectable by the parties
hence in case of failure the extraction is repeated.
E. Justification of Channel Assumptions
We now show that all channel assumptions stated in Sec-
tion III hold based on the analysis of the experimental data
collected in the test environment described in Section IV-B.
Stationary Memoryless Markov Process Assumption: We
split assumption 1 to three sub-assumptions. Let us begin
with the assumption that every channel measurement Xi
depends only on the previous measurement Xi−1 for all
i. As mentioned in our description of our test platform,
we used an artificial delay of 1300ms between ping frames
in order to induce independence between channel samples
greater than one sample apart. To evaluate this assumption
of independence we performed the following analysis. We
selected some i ∈ [1 + m,n] uniformly at random, where
n is the number of samples in a node’s measurements, and
m = 500. We then created a (m + 1)-length row vector as
{Xi, Xi−1, . . . , Xi−m}, where Xi−m is the (i−m)-th sample
from a node’s channel measurements. This was repeated
10,000 times, concatenating each of the 10,000 row vectors
together to create a 10000× (m+ 1) matrix A.
The Pearson’s linear correlation coefficients of the resulting
column vectors in A were then computed to find the correlation
of Xi with Xi−k for each k ∈ [1, 500]. From the correlation
analysis of our experimental data, we found that there exists
a statistically correlation between samples Xi and Xi−k at
a significance level of α = 0.05 for values of k up to 6. 4
Since we want to ensure that Xi and Xi−k are independent
for k > 1 for our channel assumptions to hold, we further
downsample the collected data by a factor of six in order
to induce this level of independence (i.e., ensuring at least
7800ms between samples). The remainder of our experimental
analysis is performed on this downsampled data.
We further show that for all channel samples Xi = k,
where k is a 5-bit RSSI value, that Pr[Xi−1|Xi = k]
and Pr[Xi+1|Xi = k] are uncorrelated. For every value of
k ∈ [0, 32], we derive the distributions Pr[Xi−1|Xi = k]
and Pr[Xi+1|Xi = k] and again compute the Pearson’s linear
4This clearly shows that previous idealized assumptions that the signals are
independently distributed are not precise.
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Fig. 6. Computed WSS quotient values for varying segment sizes.
correlation coefficient between the two vectors. In our exper-
imental dataset, value of k < 9 and k > 29 were infrequent
and so we were unable to compute statistically significant
correlation coefficients for those values of k. The remaining
values of k ∈ [9, 29], however, constitute approximately 95%
of our channel samples. The correlation coefficients between
the two distributions for each value of k ∈ [9, 29] are shown
in Figure 5. Our results show that Pr[Xi−1|Xi = k] and
Pr[Xi+1|Xi = k] are uncorrelated for values of k that have a
sufficient number of samples (approximately 50 or more).
Finally, we consider the assumption that the Markov process
transition probability is stationary. That is, we want to show
that: Pr[Xi = x1|Xi−1 = x0] = Pr[Xj = x1|Xj−1 = x0],
holds for any i and j with i 6= j. For this test, we use the wide-
sense stationarity (WSS) quotient [41] to evaluate whether the
first and second moments of our experimental dataset. We
computed the WSS quotient for multiple segment sizes (S)
and provide the results in Figure 6. Our results show a high
level of stationarity for the first and second moments of our
sample data across all tested values of S. We also performed
a series of K-S tests with similar results.
Stationary Observation Probability Assumption: Next, we
consider our assumption 2 that the channel sample observation
probability is stationary. Specifically, we want to show that
Pr[Yi = y|Xi = x] = Pr[Yj = y|Xj = x] holds true for any
two sample indices i and j with i 6= j, where x and y indicate
concrete RSSI values observed by Alice and Eve, respectively.
We can easily find the correlation between Yi and Xi for k ∈
[−500, 500] for each Eve node using the same approach based
on computing the linear Pearson’s correlation coefficient that
we described above for evaluating the first assumption. The
results were averaged across all five eavesdropper nodes. We
found that an eavesdropper measurement Yi was statistically
independent from some sample Xj collected by Alice for i 6= j
at a significance level of α = 0.05.
We use a technique similar to those above to evaluate
whether Pr[Yi|Xi] = Pr[Yj |Xj ] for any two sample indices i
and j with i 6= j). We first partition the set of sample indices
I = {1, 2, . . . , N} into two equal-sized random subsets I ′1 and
I ′2 such that |I ′1| = |I ′2| = ⌊n/2⌋. Eve’s channel measurement
set Y was similarly partitioned into two subsets Y ′1 and Y ′2 ,
such that Y ′1 contains the measurements in Y corresponding
to the channel sample indices in I ′1 and Y ′2 contains the
measurements in Y corresponding to the channel sample
indices in I ′2. Alice’s channel measurements were partitioned
into two subsets X ′1 and X ′2 in the same manner. We then
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Fig. 7. Distribution of conditional min-entropy in node4, x-axis is the index
of experiment, y-axis is the value of conditional min-entropy, 300 is the
maximum entropy contained in the 100 samples
compute the joint distributions between X ′1 and Y ′1 , as well as
between X ′2 and Y ′2 . For each RSSI value x ∈ [−24, 0] (the
range of possible RSSI values in our experimental platform),
we use a two-sample K-S test to determine whether the two
distributions Pr[Y ′1 |X ′1 = x] and Pr[Y ′2 |X ′2 = x] are identical.
This process was repeated a total of 10,000 times for each
of the five eavesdropper sets Y (i.e., a total of 50,000 trials).
Out of the 50,000 trials, we accepted the null hypothesis that
the two distributions were identical 100% of the time with a
significance level of α = 0.05 and so we conclude that the
assumption Pr[Yi|Xi] = Pr[Yj |Xj ] holds true when i 6= j.
Independent Observation Assumption: This states that the
dependency that potentially exists between the adversary’s
measurements comes strictly from the existing dependency
of the corresponding measurements of Alice and not any
other source. Note that from assumption 2, each Yi follows
a distribution that depends only on the value of Xi and this
dependency does not change over time. This suggests that
there exists a probabilistic function F over Xi which can
simulate the observations of Eve, i.e., Yi = F (Xi). In such
case we can prove the independent observation assumption:
Pr[Y1 = y1, . . . , Yn = yn|x1, . . . , xn]
=Pr[F (X1) = y1, . . . , F (Xn) = yn|x1, . . . , xn]
=Pr[F (x1) = y1, . . . , F (xn) = yn]
=
n∏
i=1
Pr[F (xi) = yi] =
n∏
i=1
Pr[F (Xi) = yi|Xi = xi]
=
n∏
i=1
Pr[Yi = yi|Xi = xi]
Stable Conditional Min-Entropy Assumption: The intuition
for assumption 4 is that even though at some location, some
observations may have better advantage to predict the original
measurement, the sequence would be long enough, and thus
when averaging across the whole sequence, the advantage
will diminish. To experimentally justify this assumption, we
calculate the min-entropy of the sequence received by node1
conditioned on node4’s observation in each experiment (repre-
sented by each 100-sample block). We observe that it is stably
distributed as shown in Figure 7.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented a framework for a rigorous
experimental security analysis that guarantees a reasonable
level of security about the agreed key extracted from physical
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quantities, and we show an application of the framework to
key extraction from wireless signals with concrete parameters
based on our experimental data. Our novel methodology
relies on HMM model and the estimation of conditional min-
entropy through a dynamic programming approach that relies
on the Viterbi and forward algorithms. Our work lays a
comprehensive methodology for arguing experimentally the
security of physical-layer key extraction against a passive
eavesdropper nodes and can be applied to a number of other
similar protocols in a similar way as we demonstrated here. At
a very high level, our methodology entails the following basic
steps, (i) employ a falsifiable channel abstraction, equipped
with an efficient conditional entropy approximation algorithm
and the execution of experiments that estimate the conditional
min-entropy using the algorithm (ii) justify experimentally the
channel abstraction, (iii) account for the entropy loss incurred
due to quantization and information reconciliation.
While the above is a step forward in the security analysis
of physical-layer key extraction there is still limited evi-
dence for the security of these protocols in general settings;
multitude of open questions remain and our methodology
can be extended in a number of directions: (i) increase the
size of the HMM or even substitute the HMM with more
general Bayesian networks to improve the accuracy of the
estimation of conditional min-entropy and potentially decrease
the time needed for key generation. (ii) consider the case
of active adversaries and develop protocols with adversarial
interference detection for which conditional min entropy can
still be effectively estimated. (iii) consider observations from
multiple eavesdropper nodes simultaneously.
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